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1. The Sleeping Beauty Problem
Some researchers are going to put Sleeping Beauty to sleep. During the two days
that she is asleep, they will wake her up brieϐly either once—on Monday—or
twice—onMonday and Tuesday—depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads once;
Tails twice). After eachwaking SleepingBeautywill be put back to sleepwith a drug
that erases any memory of the waking.
When Sleeping Beauty is ϐirst awakened, what should her degree of belief be that
the outcome of the toss is tails? What should her credence be upon learning that it
is Monday?
Here is a tempting line of thought. Upon waking Sleeping Beauty is faced with
three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities: 1) the coin landed
heads and it is Monday, 2) the coin landed tails and it is Monday, 3) the coin landed
tails and it is Tuesday. All of these have non-zero probability. When she learns that
it is Monday, she can rule out 3) and standard probability theory dictates that the
credence for 1) must go up. The only question is how to divide credence among the
three options upon waking.
There are two main extant positions, one by Elga (2000) and the other by Lewis
(2001) both of which I reject. Here are the credences according to Lewis:
Rational credences according to Lewis
Sleeping Beauty’s state Credence
UponWaking P(Heads)=1/2, P(Tails)=1/2
Upon Learning it is Monday P+(Heads)=2/3, P+(Tails)=1/3
On Sunday, before going to sleep, Sleeping Beauty’s credence P (Heads) that
the result will be heads is 1/2. When she wakes up, she learns nothing new that
indicates the coin landed one way rather than the other. So P(Heads)=P(Tails)=1/2.
But the updated credences upon learning it isMonday are deeply puzzling. The coin
toss could happen before Sleeping Beauty’s ϐirst waking or after being put to sleep
again after the ϐirst waking. This will not make any difference to her credences.
Suppose the coin toss happens after her being put to sleep again. According to
Lewis, Sleeping Beauty should be twice as conϐident that a fair coin toss in the
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futurewill land heads as that it will land tails. How could this be? It is not as though
she receives information fromthe future throughbackward causationor something
of that sort.
Here is Elga’s proposal.
Rational credences according to Elga
Sleeping Beauty’s state Credence
UponWaking P(Heads)=1/3, P(Tails)=2/3
Upon Learning it is Monday P+(Heads)=1/2, P+(Tails)=1/2
This avoids the problem of Lewis’s proposal. But the initial credences upon
waking are deeply puzzling. Sleeping Beauty receives no new information upon
waking that she did not have before being put to sleep on Sunday. On Sunday, her
credence P (Heads) is 1/2. How could it be rational to change her credence merely
upon waking up?
So on either view, we would have to give up deeply entrenched views about
how our credences should and should not change. The majority of those who have
weighed in on the matter side with Elga. I shall show that neither Elga nor Lewis
is right. There is no need to give up any cherished views to deal with the Sleeping
Beauty problem.
2. Sleeping Beauty and fair betting odds
Suppose upon waking Sleeping Beauty is offered a wager. If the result of the coin
toss is tails, shewins; otherwise she loses.What are the fair betting odds? Fair odds
must be such that there is no net expected gain or loss. I will use the notation n:m
for betting odds that result in a proϐit rate of n/m in case of a win.
One easyway of seeingwhat the fair betting odds are is to considerwhat happens
when the bet is repeated multiple times. If the experiment were repeated multiple
times in the Sleeping Beauty case, we can expect that two out of three wakings
will be in a week in which the result is tails. So the fair betting odds are 1:2; i.e.,
she makes 50% proϐit on each occasion she wins. She loses all the money she bets
when she loses but since she wins twice as often as she loses, she will come out
even in the long term by making 50% proϐit each time she wins. You might think
that these fair betting odds entail that on any givenwaking she is twice as conϐident
that the result is tails as that it is heads. This would support Elga’s view. But this is
amistake. The fair betting odds are indeed 1:2 but this does notmean that Sleeping
Beauty’s credence is P(Tails)=2/3. To see this, consider the following series of cases
all of which are wagers on a roll of dice coming up an even number.
Case 1 When you win (i.e. the roll of dice comes up an even number), you make
a proϐit as given by the betting odds; when you lose, you lose what you put
down.
What are the fair betting odds? Since the probability that the result is even is
1/2, the odds have to be 1:1 (i.e. 100% proϐit in case of a win). Now consider the
following case.
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Case 2 When you win, you will be allowed to double your stakes retroactively;
e.g., if you initially placed $1, you will now be allowed to retroactively change
that to $2.
What are fair betting odds? They are 1:2. Suppose you initially put down one
dollar. When you win, you are allowed to double the stakes to two dollars. If the
odds are 1:2, you will make a proϐit of one dollar after doubling your stakes. When
you lose, your stakes are not doubled so you simply lose the one dollar. Since the
probability that the roll of dice will come up an even number is 1/2, the expected
net loss/gain is 0.
We have here a situation familiar from leveraged ϐinance. You can magnify your
gains by raising your stakes (often this is done with borrowed money but it need
not). What is peculiar about Case 2 is that we have leverage applying only one way:
only the gains get magniϐied. But this too is familiar from ϐinance since it is how
a futures option contract works: you get a right (but no obligation) to raise your
stakes at a future time. You would exercise such a right if and only if by doing so
you can magnify your gains. The lower betting odds compensate for this one-way
leverage.
Your credence P(even) that the roll of dice came up even is, of course, 1/2. The fact
that you will be allowed to double your stakes if you win is no reason to be more
conϐident of one result of the roll of dice than any other.
Case 3 When you win, a device will be activated that has probability c (0c1)
to result in an audible signal. If there is a signal, you are allowed to double your
stakes but not otherwise (e.g. another dice is rolled and a sound is emitted only
if it comes up 6. If the sound is emitted you are allowed to double your stakes
but not otherwise). Youmustmakeupyourmindabout thebetting oddsbefore
you place a single bet.
What is your credence P(even)? It is 1/2. The fact that there is some probability
that you will be allowed to double your stakes is no reason to be more conϐident of
one result of the roll of dice than any other.
What would happen if we also used the device to decide whether you will be
offered any bet at all instead of merely to decide whether you will be allowed to
double your stakes? That makes no difference, either. If you had to win a lottery
to be offered the bet described here, that is no reason at all to be more conϐident
of one result of the roll of dice than any other nor would it change the fair betting
odds.
What are the fair betting odds? If c is 0, there is no doubling of the stakes so it
would simply be Case 1. If c is 1, you are guaranteed to be allowed to double your
stakes if and only if you win so that would be Case 2. We expect the fair odds to
go from 1:1 to 1:2 as c grows from 0 to 1. We can be more precise. Let g be the
proϐit-rate in case of a win. Suppose you bet one dollar. When you lose, you lose a
dollar and the probability of your losing is 1/2; so the expected loss is 0.5 dollars.
When you win, you will make a proϐit of g dollars from the ϐirst bet and there is
some probability, c, that you will make another proϐit of g dollars. The probability
of yourwinning at all is 1/2 so your expected gain is 12(g+ c  g)=0.5g(1+ c)dollars.
3
The fair betting odds require the expected gain and loss to be equal. Thus, g=1/(1+ c)
which means the fair odds are 1:(1+ c). As expected, if c is 0, the fair betting odds
are 1:1, and if c is 1, they are 1:2. The fair betting odds vary between these extremes
depending on c. But notice that your credence P(even) is ϐixed at 1/2 and does not
vary with c.
One way stakes can be doubled is if one is allowed to place another bet for the
same odds. For instance, a bet might be placed by buying a ticket and you are
allowed to buy another ticket. The next is such a case but with a twist. It is the
ϐinal case:
Case 4 When the roll of dice results in an odd number, the device in Case 3 is
triggered once. When the roll of dice results in an even number, the device is
triggered twice. Each time the device emits a signal, you are offered awager on
the roll of dice (even you win, odd you lose). However, after each wager your
memory of it is erased completely. The probability that any one triggering of
the device will result in a signal is c (0 < c  1). You must decide on the odds
upon being offered a wager.
We have c > 0 because youwould never be offered awager if c = 0.What are the
fair betting odds? They are 1:2. Consider: you might not be offered any bet at all,
but if the roll of dice comes up an odd number, you get one shot at an opportunity
to place a losing bet; if the roll of dice comes up an even number, you get two shots
at opportunities to place winning bets; moreover, each shot has an equal chance of
resulting in your placing a bet. If this setup were repeated many times, you expect
each losing bet you place to be offset by two winning bets. So the fair betting odds
are 1:2 independently of c.
What is your credence P(even) upon being offered a wager? Before we do the
math, here are some intuitive considerations. If c is less than1, there is no guarantee
that youwill be offered awager at all. So your being offered awager is evidence that
the result of the roll of dice is even since you are more likely to be offered a wager
in that case. As c gets smaller, the chances of being offered two wagers diminishes
much faster than the chances of being offered a singlewager upon the dice’s coming
up even. So your credence should become more and more like your credence for a
case in which the second triggering of the device is canceled if the ϐirst one results
in an offer of a wager. When you are offered a wager in such a case, there are three
mutually exclusive possibilities over which you should remain indifferent: 1) dice
came up odd and wager offered, 2) dice came up even and wager offered on ϐirst
attempt or 3) dice came up even and wager offered on second attempt. So as c
approaches 0, P(even) should approach 2/3. On the other hand, if c is 1, you are
guaranteed tobeoffered awager onewayor theother so yourbeingoffered awager
is no evidence. Thus, P(even) should be 1/2 if c = 1. Now the math. The probability
of being offered any wager if the dice comes up odd is c and if the dice comes up
even, it is 1  (1  c)2. So,
P(even) = 1  (1  c)
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c+ f1  (1  c)2g =
2  c
3  c (since c 6= 0)
As expected, P(even) is 1/2 if c=1, and approaches 2/3 as c approaches 0. Unlike
the fair betting odds, P(even) varies with c. This should not surprise you. Cases 2
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and 3 show that credence and fair betting odds can easily diverge depending on the
structure of the bet. In this particular case at hand, what matters for betting odds
is that you get two shots at placing a winning bet for each shot at placing a losing
bet, no matter what c is.
To remove any residual feeling of puzzlement, notice that a rise in P(even)
is coupled with a decrease in the credence that you are offered two wagers
given that you are offered a wager. We can see the precise effect of this on
the fair betting odds in the following way. Given that the dice came up even,
the probability that this is a situation in which you are offered two wagers and
hence are able to double your stakes is c2. So the probability P(double) that you
are offered two wagers given that you are offered one wager is (not given that
the dice came up even): P(double) = c21 (1 c)2 . We can now solve the following
equation for the proϐit rate g that is required to have no net expected gain/loss:
1  P(even) = P(even)  g(1+ P(double)). Solving this gives us g = 1/2, i.e. fair
betting odds of 1:2, for all c 6= 0. I leave conϐirming this as an exercise for the reader.
3. The correct credences for Sleeping Beauty
Case 4 is the generalized Sleeping Beauty problem due toWhite (2006) except that
the wager is on the result of a roll of dice rather than a coin toss. If we let c be 1,
we get the original sleeping beauty problem. Considerations for Case 4 show that
the fair betting odds on a wager that the coin landed tails in the original Sleeping
Beauty case are 1:2. This is as it should be: Sleeping Beauty knows that she gets two
opportunities of placing a winning bet for each opportunity of placing a losing bet.
But these odds do not show that her credence P(Tails) is 2/3. Rather, P(Tails)=1/2 as
Case 4 shows. This should be obvious. If, as Elga holds, she were twice as conϐident
as not that the coin lands tails and also knows that she is guaranteed to have twice
as much at stake when the coin lands tails as when it lands heads, she should be
satisϐied with betting odds 1:4. Does this mean that Lewis is right and Elga wrong?
Not quite.
You start in Case 4. You do not knowwhether the bet you are placing is your ϐirst
bet or second. Suppose you are told it is in fact the ϐirst bet. This would change
your situation to that in Case 3: you are placing your ϐirst bet while knowing that
there is probability c of being allowed to double your stakes if you win. The new
fair betting odds are a function of c and if c is 1 as in the Sleeping Beauty case, they
stay the same at 1/2 when you learn it is your ϐirst bet. What about your credence?
Your credence P(even) in Case 3 is 1/2. The same goes for Sleeping Beauty. But if so,
P+(Tails)=1/2which is in disagreement with Lewis’s proposal. Thus,
The correct credences
Sleeping Beauty’s state Credence
UponWaking P(Heads)=1/2, P(Tails)=1/2
Upon Learning it is Monday P+(Heads)=1/2, P+(Tails)=1/2
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4. Why this is not incoherent
The above result is intuitively appealing. It has the virtues of both Lewis’s and
Elga’s solutions while avoiding the objections to each. But the credences may seem
incoherent. By ruling out it is Tuesday, Sleeping Beauty rules out the last one of 1)
Monday and heads, 2) Monday and tails, 3) Tuesday and tails. Once 3) is ruled out,
standard probability theory seems to require that the credence for 1) go up; i.e.,
P+(Heads) > P(Heads).
What is wrong with this thought? We need to notice that the standard credence
updating procedure makes an important assumption about the partitioning of
possibility space into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive partitions. The
assumption is usually met as a matter of course, but there are cases in which it
is not. To see what the assumption is, consider:
Limbo You are held by a nasty organization in some secret prison system. You
know that the prisons are located either in Houston or in Chicago. There is
only one prison in Houston (No.1) but Chicago has two (No.2 and No.3). You
spend a total of 100 weeks in the prisons. 50 of these are in Houston, 50 in
Chicago. When you are in Chicago, you spend the ϐirst half of the week in No.2
and the second in No.3. Most of the time you are asleep, but when you are in
Chicago they wake you once during the week while you are in No.2, and then
another time while you are in No.3. Each time you will be given a drug so you
cannot tellwhether it is the ϐirst or the second time youwake up.When you are
in Houston, they wake you once during the week. Moreover, after each week
they give you a drug to make you forget which week it is but you do not forget
the arrangement itself.
Suppose you wake up. What is your credence that this is a Houston-week? It is
1/2 since you spend half of the weeks in Houston. Now suppose you are told that
you are not in No.3. What is your credence that you are in Houston? You might
insist that it must go up to 2/3 because when you wake up you are faced with three
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustivepossibilities: 1) youare inHouston, 2) you
are in Chicago and in No.2, 3) you are in Chicago and in No.3. The latter two have
probability 1/4 each. Standard probability theory dictates that ruling out 3) results
in change of credence for 1) to 2/3. But this would clearly be silly. After all, which 25
weeks that you spend in Chicago have you ruled out? Obviously none. Each week
in Chicago is such that you ϐirst spend some time in No.2 and the rest in No.3. The
fact that you are not in No.3 tells you that if you are in Chicago it is the ϐirst half of
the week; but none of the 50 weeks in Chicago have been ruled out.
So what is wrong with the silly reasoning? When we are faced with the task of
dividing our credence among several possible candidates of type F, e.g. weeks in
Chicago vs. weeks in Houston, we need to partition possibility space in such a way
that each partition corresponds to a distinct type of F. Otherwise, ruling out thatwe
occupy a certain regionof possibility spacewill not guarantee thatwehavewhittled
down the available options. Normally, this is no problem. If one of the partitions
corresponds to a distinct type of F, we usually can expect that a way of dividing up
the rest of possibility space that results in jointly exhaustive andmutually exclusive
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partitions satisϐies this constraint. But what we are seeing here is that in fact not
any oldway of partitioning intomutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive partitions
works: possibilities 2) and 3) are not types of weeks but just fragments of a single
type of week. Putting it metaphorically, onemight think of the partitions as regions
in a three dimensional space and the types of weeks they correspond to as their
projections onto a two dimensional plane. Such projections can coincide.
Back to the Sleeping Beauty. Her situation is like yours in Limbo. It is not as
though there are three types of weeks: 1) heads and she is woken only on Monday,
2) tails and she iswoken only onMonday, 3) tails and she iswoken only on Tuesday.
Rather, there are only two types of weeks: one in which the result is heads, another
inwhich the result is tails. The latter type ofweeks is such that she can be located at
either of two mutually exclusive temporal positions when she wakes up. But these
temporal positions do not correspond to distinct options she is interested in: both
correspond to the coin’s landing tails. So when Sleeping Beauty rules out the last
one out of 1) Monday and heads, 2) Monday and tails and 3) Tuesday and tails, this
does not amount to her ruling out one of the options she is interested in. Sleeping
Beauty’s credence that the coin landed heads does not change upon learning that
it is Monday.
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